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When foreign exchange  losses systematically  accumulate,  the
interest rates on domestic credits should be adjusted and the
central bank's cash profits should  stop being transferred  to the
government.  These  losses  may  reflect  the  central  bank's implicit
financing  of imbalances  in other  areas  of the  economy.  Eliminat-
ing losses at their source  often  requires  a fiscal adjustment,  the
need for which  may not be apparent.
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In many developing countries, the central bank  transferred  in part to future periods, so policy-
assumes an active role in mobilizing domestic  makers often overlook its consequences. It is not
and foreign exchange and allocating it to the  uncommon for these losses to be allowed to
public and private sectors. In these countries,  accumulate in large amounts, while domestic
central bank operations may create imbalances  interest rates are kept low and the central bank
between costs and revenues, usually called  keeps transferring its declining cash profits to the
quasi-fiscal deficits. Sometimes these can be as  nonfinancial public sector. The mounting burden
large as, or larger than, deficits of the  of net interest expenditures may then contribute
nonfinancial public sector. Failure to consider  significantly to monetary expansion - a situa-
these operations may give rise to the puzzling  tion that worsens when the central bank must
simultaneous occurrence of low fiscal deficits  repay its net foreign liabilities.
and high inflation.
Rocha and Saldanha argue that foreign
There have been few attempts to formally  exchange losses must be considered in evaluat-
integrate the accounts of the central bank and the  ing fiscal policy, even where losses seem to be
nonfinancial public sector. Rocha and Saldanha  largely unrealized  - as over time all losses are
examine the interactions between (nominal and  "realized" through interest flows. When foreign
real) govemment  and central bank accounts,  exchange losses systematically accumulate, the
analyze the problem of systematic foreign  interest rates on domestic credits need to be
exchange losses in the central bank, and identify  adjusted and the central bank's cash profits
policy issues associated with quasi-fiscal defi-  should stop being transferred to the government.
cits.  Otherwise, a large quasi-fiscal deficit can lead to
monetary expansion and spiraling inflation, as
Despite their limits, real measures of the  happened in Yugoslavia in the 1980s. In certain
deficit are less distorted than nominal measures,  circumstances, subsidies implicit in public sector
especially for the central bank's quasi-fiscal  credits should also be part of deficit calculations.
deficit. Central banks rarely spell out losses in
their income statements, which often show  Real quasi-fiscal deficits usually reflect
sizable nominal surpluses - even where there is  losses in other sectors of the economy and the
a real deficit in operations of the private domes-  need for a resource transfer. So correcting these
tic and foreign sectors.  deficits may require more than simply eliminat-
ing credit subsidies by increasing real interest
The accumulation of foreign exchange losses  rates to positive levels. Eliminating losses at
imposes a burden on the consolidated public  their source often requires a fiscal adjustment,
sector's finances. This burden - especially the  the need for which may not be apparent.
central bank's  foreign exchange losses - is
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In many developing  countries  the central  bank assumes  a very active role in the
mobilization  of domestic  and foreign  exchange  resources  and their allocation  to the
public  and private  sectors.  In these countries,  the central  bank operadons  may result in
significant  imbalances  between  revenues  and costs, usually  referred  to as quasi-fiscal
deficits.  In some  cases, the imbalances  include the accumulation  and realization  of
foreign  exchange  losses and systematic  default  on central bank credits  to the private
sector. As a consequence,  the deficits generated  by central  bank operations  may  become
as large or even larger than the deficits of the non-financial  public sector.  Failure to take
these operations  explicitly  into account  may give rise to apparent  puzzles  such as the
simultaneous  occurrence  of low fiscal deficits  and very high inflation  rates.
Although  the importance  of quasi-fiscal  deficits has been  widely  recognized  (see
Anand  and Van Wijnbergen  (1988),  The World Bank (1988),  Robinson  and Stella
(1988),  Teijeiro  (1989)  and Blejer  and Cheasty  (1991)), there have been few attempts  to
integrate  formally  the accounts  of the non-financial  public  sector and the central  bank .
The impact  of inflation  on central bank operations  and accounts  has not been thoroughly
examined  in the literature.  This is surprising,  since the distincdon  between  nominal  and
real deficits  is especially  relevant  to the central  bank,  given the financial  nature of its
operations.  Other critical  issues, such as the accumulation  of foreign  exchange  losses by
the central  bank are not fully analyzed  in the existing literature  either. Instead,  the
analysis  of this issue is usually  restricted  to drawing  a distinction  between  unrealized  and
realized losses,  or between  accrued  and cash losses. The dynamic  implications  of
systematic  foreign  exchange  losses  are not duly explored.  Finally,  although  it is widely
recognized  that the quasi-fiscal  functions  of the central bank should be ideally  transferred
2to the budget,  the causes  of chronic quasi-fiscal  deficits,  and the policies  that are required
to correct them, have not been thoroughly  examined.
We seek to contribute  to the literature  on fiscal and quasi-fiscal  deficits in several
ways. First, we examine  in detail the interactions  between  the government  and central
bank accounts,  in nominal  and real terms. Second,  we analyze  the problem of foreign
exchange  losses  in the central  bank, including  the reasons  for their accumulation  and the
conditions  under  which these losses  may be monetized.  The analysis  is illustrated  with
referrence  to the Yugoslav  and Hungarian  cases.  Third, we identify  some important
policy  issues related  to the problem of quasi-fiscal  deficits.  Finally,  we discuss  the
practical  problems  that are encountered  in the measurement  of central  bank and
consolidated  public  sector deficits,  and explore  alternative  methods  to measure  these
deficits  from below  the line.
The outline of the paper is as follows.  Section II reviews  alternative  definitions  of
the non-financial  public  sector deficit. Important  points giving rise to different
definitions  are the problem of foreign  exchange  losses, the appropriateness  of including
net government  lending  to the private  sector and the distinction  between  nominal  and real
deficits.  Section  III introduces  alternative  definitions  of quasi-fiscal  deficit,  and discusses
the same issues  in the context of these definitions.  Foreign  exchange  losses  and the
distinction  between  nominal  and real deficits  are discussed  in greater detail, since  these
issues  are even more relevant  in the case of the central  bank.  Section  IV merges  the
accounts  of the non-financial  and financial  public  sector into a consolidated  budget
constraint.  Section V illustrates  the analysis  of fiscal and quasi-fiscal  deficits  through  a
detailed  examination  of some stylized  cases. Finally,  the last section  summarizes  the
major issues and derives  some  conclusions.  The Appendix  provides  an analysis  of
different  methods to estimate  the public  sector deficit from below  the line.
311.  The  Deficit  of  the Non-Financial  Public  Sector.
The non-financial  public  sector (government  for short) is broadly  defined so as to
include the central  and local governments,  state enterprises  and other non-financial
public  institutions.  The central  bank and state-owned  commercial  banks are excluded. In
the discussion  of alternative  definitions  of the government's  deficit,  it is useful to start
with the following  definition:
(1)  Dg=D+i8 C8 +ibB+(i" +E) BE-i-L=Ci  +(B-L)+(B'E)
Here D = nominal  primary deficit (total  non-interest  expenditures  minus
revenues,  including  the dividends  from the central  bank and from the state-owned
commercial  banks),  ig = nominal  interest  rate on central bank's  credits to the government,
CS = nominal  stock  of central  bank's  credits to the government  (including  direct credits to
the government  as well  as any form of government  debt  held by the central  bank),
ib =  nominal  interest rate  on the government's  domestic  debt held  outside  the central
bank,  B = nominal  stock  of the government's  domestic  debt held outside  the central
bank', i' = nominal  foreign  interest rate on the government's  external  debt, B' = nominal
foreign  currency  value of the stock  of the government's  external  debt,  E = nominal
exchange  rate, i = nominal  interest rate on government  loans  to the private  sector, and
L = stock  of government  loans to the private sector.  The dots over the variables  indicate
time derivatives,  and the hats percentage  changes 2.
'Net of government  deposits  in the commercial  banks.  The interest rate ib is defined
accordingly.
2X = dX/dt  and  X=X/X.
4The government  deficit,  as defined  in (1), consists  of the primary  deficit,  the
interest expenditures  on domestic  debt  held inside and outside  the central  bank, the
depreciation-adjusted  interest  expenditures  on external  debt, minus  the interest  revenues
on credits  to the private sector. The last term in (1) indicates  the three possible  sources  of
financing  for the non-financial  public  sector deficit.  These are the changes  in central
bank credits to the government,  Cg, the changes  in net domestic  debt outside  the central
bank, (B - L) , and the changes  in external  debt, (B E) . It should  be noted that,
although  the central  bank's  credits to the government  are included,  the central  bank's
operations  with the private domestic  and foreign  sectors are excluded  from the definition.
There are three noteworthy  points  related  to this definition  of the non-financial
public  sector deficit.  First, the nominal  capital  losses on the stock  of external  debt arising
from nominal  exchange  rate devaluations  are included.  Second,  the increases  in
government  lending to the private sector are not included.  Instead,  government  lending  is
treated  as a financing  item,  and subtracted  from the changes  in gross  domestic  debt with
the private sector. Third, investment  expenditures  are taken into account  in the
calculation  of the primary deficit.  We now discuss  these two points in more detail.
As mentioned  above, the nominal  deficit as defined in (1) includes  all capital
losses on the stock  of external debt  due to exchange  rate devaluations, EB'E = EB*,
independently  of whether  these  foreign  exchange  losses  are all realized in the current
period 3. Foreign  exchange  losses  are realized  through  interest payments  and through  net
repayments  of the stock.  The amount  immediately  realized  depends  on the schedule  of
interest  and net debt repayments,  and is usually  a small fraction  of the total loss.  From
3Note  that (i  + E)BE= iB*E+  EB,  where  the first term is a cash cost and the second
the capital loss.
5another  point of view, one can see these losses as being automatically  financed  by
foreign lenders,  who "agree"  to increase  the domestic  currency  value of their loans (since
they are primarily  concerned  with the foreign  currency  value of these loans). Therefore,
the inclusion  of foreign  exchange  losses provides  important  information  about the
potential  burden imposed  by exchange  rate devaluations  on the public  finances.
However,  these  losses do not generate  any significant  immediate  pressure  on the
economy,  and a deficit definition  that  excludes  them is also useful 4:
(2)  D1 = D+i,C, +i4B+i*BE-i 1L = CJ  +(B-  L)+B'E.
The second  question  is whether  government  lending  to the private sector  should
be included  in the deficit definidon.  The answer to this question  involves  conceptual  and
practical  considerations.  There are, in fact, solid arguments  for not including  the net
changes  in government  loans to the private sector  in the non-financial  public  sector's
deficit. By borrowing  from and lending to the private  sector, the government  is simply
acting as a financial  intermediary,  just like any other private  financial  iiistitution.  If these
financial  operations  are carried out at market  rates and the loans are effectively
recovered,  they may  not produce  any significant  impact  on aggregate  demand,  inflation
or the current  account,  relative to a situation  where the lending is conducted  by the
private sector.
The macroeconomic  impact  of the government's  loans to the private  sector is
greater in the cases  where these  loans  are not effectively  recovered,  or where they  are
made at rates below  market  rates. Government  loans  that are not repaid  are actually
grants or transfers,  and should obviously  be included  in the definiton of the deficit.  The
problem of adjusting  the deficit definition  for these  factors  is not so much conceptual  as
4Any  possible  link  between  urealized  capilal  losses  on public  debt  and private  savings  along  Ricardian
lines  (see  Barro  (1974  and 1979))  is ruled  out  here.
6practical.  It may be very difficult  to screen  the government's  loan portfolio  and separate
loans from transfers.  The concession  of government  loans at below market rates  also
involves  a transfer  of resources  to the private  sector that should  arguably  be included  in
the deficit.  The problem here  lies in the measurement  of the implicit  subsidy.  The
concept  of real deficit to be introduced  below provides  one solution  to this problem.  The
subsidy  and deficit definitions  could be extended  to include all foregone  revenues 5.
The inclusion  of changes  in government  loans to the private sector  in the
government's  deficit is still frequently  advocated,  independently  of whether  these loans
are collected  and correctly  priced.  The argument  is based on the observation  that these
loans  effectively  increase  the government's  financing  requirements.  The argument  is
sometimes  stretched  by the observation  that an increase  in the govemment's  financing
requirements  might ultimately  result in an increase  in government's  borrowing  from the
central bank and in monetary  expansion.  Thus, according  to this argument,  the relevant
deficit definition  for fiscal policy  evaluation  is:
(3)  Ds =D+i8C 8 +ibB+ iB*E+(L-i,L)=C.  +B+B E .
Equation  (3) defines  the public  sector borrowing  requirements  (PSBR),  a measure
of the government's  deficit which is commonly  employed  for the assessment  of the fiscal
policy stance.  The term (L-ilL)  indicates  the financing  requirements  implied  by the
expansion  of government  loans to the private sector.
5The problem  of measuring  a credit subsidy  lies in the choice  of a benchmark  interest
rate. One option is to compare  nominal  rates with the rate of inflation  (the criterion
implicit  in the concept  of real deficit used in this paper).  If the subsidy  and deficit
definitons are defined  so as to include all foregone revenues,  the benchmark  is the
market interest  rate.
7The argument  that government  lending  to the private sector should  be included  in
the deficit because  it increases  financing  requirements  is frequently  presented  without
further  elaboration.  As mentioned  above, although  financing  requirements  are obviously
increased,  the macroeconomic  impact  of government  borrowing  and lending activities  is
by no means obvious.  If the government  finances  its loans  to the private  sector through
issues  of market-priced  securities,  that does not result necessarily  in a crowding  out of
private  sector activities  by the public  sector. The immediate  result is rather a reallocation
of scarce financial  resources  among  different  private sector activities.  The final result
depends  on whether  the government's  intervention  involves  a gain or a loss in efficiency.
Although  the record of the government's  intervention  in resource  allocation  has
generally  been poor, especially  in the case of developing  countries,  such intervention
may be in principle  justified  in cases of severe  credit rationing  due to imperfect
information  and perceptions  of excessively  high credit risk. For instance,  government
loans to education  as well as loans to small enterprises  may correct market inefficiencies
and generate  high returns to the economy  as a whole.  Government  housing  loans may
also alleviate  housing bottlenecks,  although  in the latter case resources  may be indeed
diverted  from other  sectors of industry,  with adverse  consequences  for growth.
The conclusion  seems  to be that the inclusion  of government  loans  to the private
sector in the deficit definition  without  proper  consideration  of the nature  and conditions
of such lending  activities  may  provide a misleading  indication  of the stance  of fiscal
policy. It is only after such examination  is made that one can ascertain  whether  the fiscal
deficit thus defined is crowding  out productive  investment,  or pressing the current
account,  or still pressing  domestic  markets  to the point where  monetary  accommodation
becomes  inevitable.
8The government's  real deficit can be analyzed  along similar  lines. Dividing  all
terms in equation  (1) by the price level,  P, multiplying  and dividing  the terms
denominated  in foreign  currency  by the foreign  price level P', and splitting  the nominal
interest  rates between  the relevant  real rate and the inflation  premium, i = r + P , one
obtains:
(4)  d, =  d +r*c,  +rbb+(r +e)b'e-r,l  - c  +(b-i)+b  e .
Here rg, rb and r 1are, respectively,  the real interest  rates on government  debt
held  inside and outside  the central bank,  and on goveriment loans to the private sector, r'
is the real foreign  interest rate, e = EP'/P  is the real exchange  rtte. All other lower
case variables  are defined  in real terms, x = X / P . Note also the extensive  use of the
identity x -X/P  - PA in arriving  at equation  (4).
As equation  (4) indicates,  the real deficit is not just the nominal  deficit divided  by
the price level.  The critical difference  is the exclusion  of the inflation  component  from
the government's  interest  payments  and revenues.  The argument  for the utilization  of a
real definition  of the deficit has been  extensively  discussed  in the literature.  When
inflation  increases  and the real rate of interest remains  constant,  nominal  interest
payments  also increase.  However,  these larger payments  are just a compensation  given to
asset-holders  for their nominal  capital  losses due to inflation.  On the assumption  that
asset-holders  do not channel  these revenues  into consumption,  such increase  in nominal
expenditures  does  not exert any additional  pressure  on aggregate  demand.  Instead,  the
asset-holders  will be willing  to reinvest  these revenues  in newly issued  government
securities,  allowing  the govemment  to roll-over  the existing  stock of debt under  the same
conditions  of price and maturity 6.
'See Eisner and Pieper (1984),  and Eisner(1986,  1989a,  and 1989b)  for discussions  of
inflation-induced  distortions  in the measurement  of the deficit  and other macroeconomic
9Although  the discussion  in the literature  has centered on the effect of inflation  on
interest payments  on domestic  debt, the same line of reasoning  can be applied to the
interest revenues  on government  loans to the private  sector, and to the interest
expenditures  on the government's  external  debt. Finally, the same  argument  can also be
applied to the problem of capital losses  on the stock of external  debt. While nominal
exchange  rate devaluations  generate  capital losses  by increasing  the domestic  currency
value of the stock  of debt, domestic  price inflation  generates  a capital  gain on the stock.
Thus, only real capital losses  should  be included  in an inflation-adjusted  definition  of the
deficit,  as in equation  (4).
It should  be noticed that the deficit,  as given by (4), equals (minus)  the variation
in the government's  real net worth.  This means,  of course, that all capital  gains and losses
due to inflation  and exchange  rate devaluations  are properly  taken into account.
However,  ilie question  of whether  unrealized  real capital  gains or losses  on the stock  of
external  debt should  be included  in the definition  still remains.  Likewise,  the question of
whether  government  lending  to the private sector should  be included  in the definition
also remains,  whether  the deficit is defined in nominal  or real terms. Thus, defining
equations  (2) and (3) in real terms yields:
(5)  d8 =d+r8c+  +rbb+r  b e-rl=i',  +(b-i)+be
(6)  dg =d +r8cS  +rbb+rb*e+(i-r,l)  +b+b'e.
variables,  with focus in the US case.  Cukierman  and Mortensen  (1983) provide  a similar
analysis  for the OECD  countries.  Blejer,  Tanzi and Teijeiro (1987)  discuss  the conditions
under  which the inflation-corrected  deficit provides  a better indication  of the fiscal policy
stance.
10At this point one may become  confused  by the proliferation  of alternative
definitions  of the deficit.  However,  a careful  evaluation  of fiscal policy  may indeed
require the use of more than one indicator.  As mentioned  above, measures  of the deficit
that include and exclude  exchange  rate-induced  losses  are both useful indicators  of fiscal
policy. In particular,  the latter may provide  very timely and useful  information  on future
budgetary  pressures  arising  from the realization  of such losses  and the need for fiscal
adjustments.
Ultimately,  none of the definitions  presented  above may fully  capture the actual
underlying  behavior  of economic  agents.  For instance,  while it can be argued  that the real
deficit provides  a more acurate  indication  of the fiscal policy  stance  than the nominal
deficit under  most possible  circunstances,  it is not itself free of problems.  If there is some
degree  of money  illusion, domestic  asset-holders  will tend to consume  part of the
inflation-related  interest  revenues  and will be unwilling  to refinance  the roll over of the
stock of government  debt under the same  conditions.  In this case the real deficit will
underestimate  the extent of fiscal pressures  on the economy 7. Similarly,  foreign  holders
of government  debt may be unwilling  to reinvest  the foreign  inflation  component  of
interests.  The reason for ti,is may be money  illusion  or the availability  of information
that lenders  loans  to the country  an unattractive  proposition.
Clearly,  there is no easy solution  to these and other problems.  Instead,  what the
above discussion  suggests  is the need for good  judgement  in the selection  and
interpretation  of the most relevant  indicators.  Knowledge  about the specific  country
conditions  and institutions  must dictate  the choice of the indicators  and  even the
construction  of taylor-made  indicators.
7See Blejer, Tanzi and Teijeiro (1987).
11111.  The Quasi-Fiscal  Deficit  of the Central Bank.
Consider  the simplified  balance  sheet of a representative  central  bank in
Figure 18.
Figure 1
Balance Sheet of the Central  Bank





The central  bank is assumed  to hold foreign  assets FA, and extend credits to the
government  Cg , and to the private sector Cp . Its liabilities  are the money  base H, (equal
to the sum of currency  Cu , and bank reserves  S), and foreign  exchange  liabilities,  FL. Its
net worth,  NW, is the difference  between  its assets and liabilities,  and its credits to the
government  are net from any government  deposits.  It is assumed  that the private  sector
does not hold sight deposits  at the central  bank 9.
The central  bank's  balance  sheet may be written  in terms of changes  as:
(7)  NFA  +  Ct +  Cp =  H +  NWcb
8The  central  bank's  non-financial  assets are ignored.
90therwise,  any such deposits  should  also be included  in the definition  of base money.
12where NFA = FA - FL denotes  the net foreign assets  of the central  bank expressed  in
domestic  currency.  These may become  large and negative  if, for instance,  the central
bank borrows  actively abroad,  or manages  schemes  to attract  the remittances  of nationals
working  abroad,  or still incurs  in foreign  exchange  liabilities  as a result  of the
implementation  of foreign  exchange  insurance  schemes.  The reason net foreign  assets
turn out to be negative  in these  cases  is that the central  bank does not hold an equivalent
stock of foreign  assets.  That, in turn, results from sales of previously  acquired  foreign
exchange  to the government  or the private  sector, and the channelling  of the revenues
from the sales towards  credits  denominated  in domestic  currency.
The variations  in the central bank's  net worth are identically  equal to the
difference  between the central  bank's revenues  and expenditures,  including  the capital
gains and losses due to exchange  rate devaluations.  Thus, these  variations  are obtained
through  a combination  of its income statement  and revaluation  accounts:
(8)  NWtb = (i  + E)NFA  E+isCs  ipCp -iRS-A
The first term on the right hand side of (8) is a depreciation-adjusted  interest
revenue or cost, depending  on the sign of net foreign  assets.  Here we make the
simplifying  assumption  that the central bank earns  on its foreign  assets the same
international  interest  rate that it pays on its foreign  liabilities.  The second and third terms
are the interest revenues  collected  on credits  to the government  and to the private sector,
respectively.  Next comes the interest  expenses  on bank reserves,  and finally the dividend
payments  to the government,  4IO.  Equation  (8) does not cover all possible  operations  that
might affect the central  bank's profits.  For instance,  the central bank can run a profit
'Olt  is assumed  that the government  is the central  bank's  sole shareholder.
13(loss)  if it sells foreign  exchange  at a rate higher (lower) than the buying rate. These and
other  operations  are not included  for the sake of simplicity.
Note that the central  bank may experience  a decline  in its net worth while also
generating  cash profits. This situation  may be caused  by the provision  of domestic  credits
at interest  rates below the depreciation-adjusted  cost of net foreign  assets (assumed  to be
negative),  or by the transfer  of cash profits to the government.  If the central  bank
transfers  all its cash profits to the government,  then it experiences  a decline  in its net
worth equal to the foreign  exchange  losses in the period.
If the central  bank's  nominal  deficit is defined  as the inverse  of the variations  in
its net worth,  then it is given by equation  (8) (with a negative  sign). In the special  case
where  the government  has no non-financial  assets and does not invest  this definition  is
analogous  to the definition  of the government's  deficit in (1):
(9)  De, =  -NW,=  -[(i  C+E)NFAKE+igC1  +ipCp  -i,S-D]  =  H -NFA -C8 -Cp  .
As in the discussion  of the government's  deficit,  it could be argued  that the central
bank's  deficit should  exclude  the capital  gains/losses  on net foreign  assets (as long as they
remain  unwrealized)  and, under  certain  conditions,  include  the changes  in credits to the
private sector. In these two cases, the nominal  deficit of the central  bank would  be
respectively  defined by equations  (10) and (11) (the counterpart  of equations  (2) and
(3)):
(10)  Deb  =-[iNFAE+isC  +ipCp  - iS - D]  = H-NFA E-C  -Cp
(11)  D; =-[iCNFAE+i,C,  +iipCp  - iS-D]+  C  =  F-NFWAE-C  -
Of course, any of the equations  (9)-(  11) could be solved for the changes  in base
money,  yielding  the same result:
14(12)  H = -[i*NFA`E+i 5 C,  +ipC,  -iS-  A]+NFKAE+C, +Cp  .
Even though  these are just manipulations  of accounting  identities,  they do provide
valuable  insights  on the sources  of monetary  expansion  in any given country.  Equation
(12) states that base money  expands  whenever  net foreign  assets  and domestic  credits are
expanded,  or when the central bank runs an excess of interest  costs plus dividends  paid
over interest revenues.  This last term is usually  disregarded  in monetary  policy  analysis,
but is at the core of the problem  of monetary  disequilibrium  in some developing
countries.
Notice that the inclusion  of foreign  exchange  losses in the definition  of the deficit
does not make a difference,  as far as the immediate  impact  on base money  is concerned.
This is actually  the argument  that is frequently  used for its exclusion  from the definition.
An exchange  rate depreciation  generates  an immediate  increase  in the domestic  currency
value of net foreign  assets (assumed  to be negative)  and a matching  increase  in the stock
of foreign  exchange  losses (a decrease  in the central bank's  net worth), with no
immediate  impact  on base money  creation". However,  the capital  losses  may be
eventually  monetized  through  two channels.  First, through  net repayments  of foreign
liabilities  and, second,  through  larger interest  payments  on the stock of (negative)  net
foreign  assets.  These two effects are captured  in equation  (12).
It follows  that the accumulation  of foreign  exchange  losses  does provide very
important  information  for fiscal policy  evaluation,  even when these losses  do not
constitute  a current source  of monetary  expansion.  When foreign  exchange  losses are
allowed to accumulate  over time, the stock of central  bank's  earning assets shrinks
"Notice that that the capital  loss terms, ENFA' , on both sides of equation  (10) cancel
out
15relative  to the stock  of interest  paying  liabilities.  This eventually  generates  cash losses
that may have to be financed  through  monetary  expansion,  even if the principal  of
foreign liabilities  is not being repaid.  Of course, net repayments  of foreign  liabilities  tend
to worsen  the financial  condition  of the central  bank and may trigger further  monetary
expansion.
The existence  of central bank credits  to the orivate  sector creates  another difficult
conceptual  issue. As in the case of government  loans to the private sector, a judgment
must be made on whether  the changes  in these loans should  also be included  in the
definition  of the deficit.  The answer  to this question  requires  a very careful examination
of the central  bank's  portfolio,  since the quality of central  bank loans  may vary widely
across  countries  and over time. For instance,  if the central  bank borrows  abroad  and
extends  domestic  credits  to unprofitable  enterprises,  there is clearly  a deficit associated
with the operation,  since the central bank is acquiring  liabilities,  but no meaningful  assets
as counterparts.  Over time a serious  situation  may  develop,  as the central  starts servicing
its liabilities,  but is unable  to collect the interest  and principal  from its assets.  In more
general  terms, if the central bank extends  credits that cannot be recovered,  that creates  a
serious problem  of monetary  management  that usually  results in excessive  monetary
expansion.  In these  cases  excessive  monetary  creation  may happen  by omission,  i.e., the
new credits  extended  by the central  bank are not offset by the repayment  of outstanding
credits.
On the other extreme,  one finds ordinary liquidity  rediscounts,  which are
extended  exclusively  for the purposes  of monetary  management  and that are fully repaid
by the borrowing  banks.  These rediscounts  may be extended under  conditions  of
monetary  equilibrium  at low rates  of inflation.  In this kind of situation  it is clear that
there is not a deficit associated  with central  bank lending  to the private sector.
16In most developed  countries  the central bank's  financial  operations  are not a
source of macroeconomic  imbalances.  The central  bank exercises  its traditional  functions
and earns  profits, which are partially  or fully transferred  to the government's  budget  as a
non-tax  revenue.  In contrast,  in many developing  countries  the central  bank intervenes
extensively  in the process of financial  intermediation.  Such intervention  usually  involves
the allocation  of large amounts  of credits to favored  sectors  at subsidized  terms, and may
result in significant  imbalances  between  revenues  and costs, especially  when the credits
are backed by foreign  liabilities.
For instance,  the central  banks of several  developing  countries  borrow  directly
abroad,  or run schemes  to attract the savings of nationals  working  abroad,  while
extending  credits  in domestic  currency  at an interest  rate that  does not reflect the cost of
foreign  liabilities 1 2. The introduction  of foreign  exchange  insurance  schemes  by central
banks in developing  countries  may create a similar  problem,  since  the insurance  premium
is usually  severely  underpriced  in these countries.  Another  common  source of problems
in developing  countries  is the concession  of credits to banks or enterprises  in fragile
fmancial  conditions.  These credits  may be extended  in situations  of emergency  - the
central  bank may  be induced  to increase  its lending  in order to avert a financial  crisis - or
simply  result from ordinary institutional  practices.  For instance,  in some Eastem
European  countries  all foreign  borrowings  were conducted  by the central bank,  which
also extended  credits  to enterprises  that were clearly  unable  to repay them.
The lack of transparency  involving  central  bank accounts  in several  developing
countries  may allow a deteriorating  financial  situation  to remain  undetected  for a long
liThis is actually the final result of three different  operations.  The first operation  involves
an equivalent  increase  in the central  banks'  foreign assets  and liabilities.  The second
operation  involves  sales of foreign  exchange  by the central  bank to importers.  Finally,
domestic  credits are granted  with the proceeds  from the sales.
17period of time. In some  cases this is caused  by the deliberate  window-dressing  of central
bank income  statements.  For instance,  a large share of interest revenues  may be accrued
but  not effectively  collected,  while interest  expenses  are effectively  paid. Another
example  of creative accounting  involves  the inclusion  of foreign  exchange  gains on
foreign  assets  in the flow of interest revenues,  together  with the exclusion  of foreign
exchange  losses  on the foreign  liabilities  altogether  from the income  statement' 3. Of
course, it is impossible  to exclude  the accumulation  of foreign  exchange  losses from the
balance  sheet. However,  these  can be disguised  under  one of the several  entries that
comprise  the net worth of the central  bank.
In other cases  the central  bank's  accounts  may be just poorly interpreted,  even
when there is no attempt to conceal  losses  of any kind. Such misinterpretation  may
simply  result from the failure to distinguish  nominal  from real interest flows in the
central  bank operations.  For instance,  consider the situation  of a central  bank that
borrows  abroad  and provides  subsidized  loans  in domestic  currency.  Suppose  that this
situation  has resulted  in a large accumulation  of foreign  exchange  losses and has driven
the stock  of interesting-earning  credits well below  the stock  of interest-paying  foreign
liabilities.  It is clear that a central bank in this situation  would  be unable to balance  its
accounts  under low rates  of inflation  and nominal  interest  rates. However,  if inflation is
high, the domestic  nominal  interest rates will be much higher than the foreign  interest
rates. Such difference  in nominal  rates may  partly or fully offset the difference  between
Adomestic  credits  and foreign  liabilities,  giving the impression  of an equilibrium  when the
central bank is in fact  running  a real deficit.  Moreover,  such a deficit may be an
important  source  of monetary  expansion.
OCapital  gains  and losses  should  either be explicity  shown  in the income  statement  or put
in a separate  revaluation  account.
18This example  suggests  that the quasi-fiscal  character  of some  of the central  bank
operations  becomes  more transparent  when inflation  is properly  taken into account.
Indeed,  the distinction  between  nominal  and real deficits  is particularly  relevant  in the
case of the central bank,  since central  bank operations  are exclusively  financial.  To start
the analysis  of real quasi-fiscal  deficits,  consider  first a definition  identical  to the
variation  of the central  bank's real net worth.  Such definition  may be obtained  by
dividing equation  (9) by the price level,  splitting  the nominal  interest rates between  the
real rate and inflation  premium  and considering  the identities NW*I  P = n  w+  Pnw and
H I P = h  + Ph , where H I P  are the total seignorage  revenues,  equal to the variations  in
real base money, h, plus the inflation tax, Ph:
(13)  - nwcb  = -[(r  +  )nfa +  rcp +rc  - 6-is+  Ph] =h-nfa  - c  -cp
Here the small case variables  are defined  as the real variables,  as before (6 =
AlP), and the r's are the relevant  real interest  rates. Note that such a definition  of the real
quasi fiscal deficit includes  the inflation  tax, net of the interest paid on reserves,
Ph  - i.s .That is, the real net worth of the central  bank is increased  by the inflation  tax
and decreased  by the payment  of interests  on reserves.  Note also that if no interest is paid
on reserves  (i = 0) the central  bank's  real net worth is increased  by the full value of the
inflation tax. If some interest  is paid on reserves,  the inflation  tax is only fully collected
on currency,  while the amount  which is effectively  collected  on reserves  depends  on the
real interest  rate. The net inflation  tax revenues  are then PC.  - rs = Ph  -is
Why would  it make sense  to define  the central  bank's  deficit as (the negative  of)
its net worth variation,  when (in the general  case) the analogous  definition  for the
government  deficit was inappropriate?  The central  bank's  non-financial  assets are usually
insignificant,  when compared  to its financial  assets.  They can therefore  be valued  with a
19reasonable  degree  of accuracy.  It follows  that the principal  objection  against using a net
worth-based  deficit definition  does not apply in this case. However,  the definition  (13) of
real central  bank deficit,  which  equates  the deficit to the (negatis  A of) central  bank's  real
net worth variation,  leads  to some  counterintuitive  results.  One can envisage  a steady
state with a high rate of inflation  where all variables  in the central bank's  balance  sheet
(including  net worth) are constant  in real terms. For instance,  assume  a central  bank that
has a large stock  of foreign  liabilities  and that provides  subsidized  financing  to the public
and private sectors.  In this case r  > 0  and all  r's < 0,  i.e., the central bank runs a
deficit in its real interest  flows. However,  the inclusion  of the inflation  tax as an ordinary
source of revenue  makes the real deficit,  as defined  in (13), equal to zero.
It follows  that a definition  that treats the inflation  tax (net of interest on reserves)
as a financing  item,  instead of an ordinary  source of revenue,  may convey  more
information  about the effective  financial  situation  of the central  bank. Equation  (14)
defines  the central  bank's real deficit as (minus)  its net worth variation net of any
inflation  tax revenues:
(14)  db = -[nfWcb-(Ph  -i,S)]  = -[(r' +e)nfa  +rpcp  +r 5c8 -83=
H  .
Here H/P - is  is the net seignorage  collected  by the central bank,  equal to gross
seignorage  less the interests  paid on commercial  bank reserves.  As above, alternative
definitions  may  exclude  the capital  losses/gains  on net foreign  assets and include the
changes  in credits  to the private  sector:
H  - (15)  d,,,  ==  -(r  nfa e+rpcp+rc,a  -)=  D-i,s-nfa  e-c  -c
20(16)  dCb-==-(r'nfa'e+recprc,-a)+  cp  s - nfiae  - c 
These  definitions  of the  central  bank's  real deficit  reveal  clearly  the transfers  of
real resources  that  may  take  place  in an inflationary  economy.  They  also  indicate  what
type  of corrections  may  be needed  in order  to stabilize  an economy  where  the monetary
imbalances  are rooted  in the central  bank.  If the seignorage  collected  by the  central  bank
is being  channelled  towards  the servicing  of foreign  liabilities  and the  concession  of
credit  subsidies  to the public  and private  sectors,  monetary  control  may  require  a variety
of measures,  such  as the increase  in interest  rates  on central  bank  credits,  the interruption
of central  bank's  explicit  transfers  to the government's  budget,  and possibly  the
absorption  of central  bank  foreign  liabilities  by the  government.  This  last  measure  is
required  if the real  stock  of central  bank  credits  has fallen  to such  low levels  that  an
increase  in real  interest  rates  to reasonable  levels  does  not  generate  enough  real  resources
to cover  the servicing  of foreign  liabilities.
For  instance,  the Yugoslav  stabilization  program  of 1990  included  the transfer  to
the federal  budget  of central  bank  credit  subsidies  to agriculture  and  exports,  as well  as
the absorption  of most  of the  central  bank's  foreign  liabilities  by the federation.  Such
absorption  took  place  through  the replacement  of the large  stock  of foreign  exchange
losses  in the central  bank  by an equivalent  stock  of federal  government  bonds  indexed  to
the exchange  rate and  yielding  an interest  rate  equal  to LIBOR.  Of course,  all these
measures  required  ultimately  a fiscal  adjustment  by the federal  government' 4.
1 4See  Coricelli  and Rocha  (1991)  for an analysis  of the Yugoslav  and  Polish  stabilization
programs  of 1990  and  Bole  and  Gaspari  (1990),  Mates  (1991),  Rocha  (1991),  and  The
World  Bank  (1989)  for  detailed  studies  of Yugoslavia's  quasi-fiscal  deficits  and inflation.
21The Yugoslav  case suggests  that proper examination  of the central  bank's foreign
exchange  losses may prevent  the emergence  of serious  macroeconomic  imbalances.  If the
inclusion  of foreign  exchange  losses  results in consistently  large real deficits,  that
indicates  that domestic  credits  are not correctly priced,  and/or that the transfer  of the
central bank's  cash profits to the government  is excessive.  The prevention  of a serious
financial  situation  requires  not only a correction  of interest rates but also the interruption
of the transfer  of central bank  cash profits to the government.  Failure  to implement  these
corrective  measures  in time inevitably  generates  the need for an even larger fiscal
adjustment  in the future.
These  corrective  measures  may not be easily implemented  in many  countries,
since policy  makers  may  interpret the existence  of cash profits as an indication  that the
central  bank enjoys a comfortable  financial  situation,  and that it would  be a "waste"  for
the institution  to retain these  profits, as opposed to transferring  them to the government.
However,  it is precisely  the retention  of cash profits that may prevent  a drastic decline  in
the central bank's  net worth and the emergence  of a situation  where  the central  bank
starts running  cash losses.  Moreover,  when inflation increases,  the assessment  of the
situation  may become  even more complicated,  because  domestic  nominal  interest rates
are likely to increase  along with the rate of inflation, even when real interest rates  remain
negative.
Hungary  and Turkey  provide  additional  examples  of real quasi-fiscal  deficits
caused  by the combination  of massive  borrowings  abroad  by the central  bank and the
concession  of low interest  rate credits to the public and private sectors.  In the late 1980s
the governments  of both countries  acknowledged  the difficult  financial  situations  faced
by their respective  central  banks,  and absorbed  the stocks  of foreign  exchange  losses. In
the case of Hungary,  the foreign  exchange  losses were replaced  by a stock  of credits to
22the government,  while in Turkey the government  replaced  the central bank losses by a
stock  of long-term  securities.  However,  in neither  country  the real quasi-fiscal  deficit has
been  effectively  eliminated.  This is because  the correction  in the stocks  has not been
accompanied  by a correction  in the flows. In Hungary,  the amount  of interests  effectively
paid by the government  on the converted  stock seems  to be negligible,  while in Turkey
the amount  of interests  paid is not only small,  but is also financed  by new central bank
credits to the government.
The final outcome  has been  at best mixed  in the Hungarian  and Turkish  cases.
Although  some of the institutional  measures  required to eliminate  the real quasi-flscal
deficit were indeed  implemented,  the essential  ingredient  of the solution  - a fiscal
transfer  from the government  to the central  bank - was not implemented.  The high rates
of inflation  of both countries  (30 and 70 percent  in Hungary  and Turkey,  respectively)
may be still masking  the financial  problems  of their central  banks.  Another  explanation
for the lack of an effective  adjustment  lies simply  in the difficulty  to generate  a sufficient
fiscal adjustment  at the government  level. In any case, the real quasi-fiscal  deficit
remains and seems  to be affecting  adversely  the conduct  of monetary  policy in both
countries.
IV.  The  Consolidated  Public  Sector  Deficit.
The deficits  of the non-financial  public  .sector  and of the central bank can be
easily consolidated,  whether  they are defined  in nominal  or real terms. Consider,  for
instance  the nominal  deficits in (1) and (9). Adding  these two equations,  one obtains
(17)  J= Da  +ibB  +  (i  +  E)(B E-NFAKE)-i,L-ioCp  - i,S  =
- H-Co  +  (B - L)+(B'E-  NFA*E).
23Here D. is the government's  primary deficit,  adjusted  so as to exclude  all
dividends  received  from the central  bank. This definition  of the consolidated  nominal
deficit,  A excludes  government  and central  bank lending  to the private  sector, and
includes  the capital losses  on the net external  debt of the consolidated  public  sector - the
government's  external  debt minus  the net foreign  assets of the central  bank.  The last term
in (17) indicates  the three possible  sources  of public  sector financing.  These are: (i) the
changes  in base money,  (ii) the changes in net domestic  debt, and (iii) the changes  in net
external  debt. It is tedious  to write other definitions,  where the capital losses  are
excluded,  and public  sector  lending to the private sector is included.
The real  consolidated  public  sector deficit  c can also be easily obtained,  by
addition  of (4) and (14):
(18)  1 = d,,  +rbb+(r'  +  e)(be - nfa e)-r,l -rrpc-
=X  - I;S-C  ~+(b-i)+(be  C-tnfa'e)  .
This deficit  may be estimated  either by excluding  the inflation  component  from
the nominal  interest revenues  and expenditures  of the public  sector, or by calculating  the
real changes  in the net domestic  and external  debts and the net seignorage  revenues  on
base money.  Once  again, the equations  may be defined  so as to exclude  the real capital
losses  on the net external  debt, or to include  public  sector lending to the private sector.
The consolidation  of the government  and the central  bank cancels  out all explicit
and implicit  transfers  between  the two entities.  Of course, the consolidated  deficit arises
as a result  of the government  and central bank operations  with the private  domestic  and
foreign  sectors.  Thus, equations  (17) and (18) are unaffected  by the transfer  of fiscal
24funcdons  to the central  bank and also indicate  clearly the sources  of public  sector
financing,  irrespective  of where the financing,needs  are located.
V. Some  Stylized  Examples.
In order to clarify the analysis  of real fiscal and quasi-fiscal  deficits we provide
three stylized  examples  in this section.  The first of these is the case of government
deficits  financed  exclusively  from zero-interest  central  bank credits.  In the other two
examples  we assume that the government's  accounts  are fully balanced  and the pressures
towards  monetization  are coming  from different  sources. Any  one of these latter two
cases would  thus present  a puzzle to the less informed  observer.  The imbalances  are
either in the private sector (enterprise  or bank losses, subsidization  of selected  consumer
goods)  or in the central bank, which  incurs  valuation  losses.
Case  1: Primary  deficits financed  by Interest  rate  subsidies
Consider  the case of a central bank that does not have foreign  assets or liabilides,
does  not extend  credits to the private sector, does not pay interest  on reserves,  does not
charge interest  on its credits  to the government,  and does not pay dividends.  To simplify,
assume also that the government's  net foreign  and private  domestic  debts  are both zero.
In this case the real revenues  collected  from the holders of base money  are fully
transferred  to the government.  Part of this transfer  is effected  in the form of an interest
rate subsidy,  while the remainder,  which  equals the real fiscal deficit,  takes the form of
real credit expansion.  Under  these  conditions,  the nominal  and real financing  flows are as
depicted  in equations  (19)-(24):
(19)  D, =D=C,
(20)  d, -d +rtc, =c,
25(21  C=&  i=E=+Ph (21)  P  8  PC8  p
(22)  db  8cg =p-c8
H (23)  l = dg + dCb=p
Equation  (19)  gives the government's  nominal  deficit, which  is equal to its
primary  deficit (since i8 = 0). The government's  real  deficit is given by (20). Since
ig  = 0,  r 8c8 = -Pc,  . Equation  (21) is a balance  sheet identity  for the central bank.
Equation  (22) gives  the central  bank's  real deficit,  which  is equal to the subsidy  given to
the government.  Finally,  equation  (23), which is the sum of (20) and (22), shows  that the
consolidated  public  sector deficit is the sum of the government  and central bank deficits,
and is entirely  financed  from seignorage  revenues.
One  can easily envisage  a steady  state with a constant rate of inflation, where  the
real stocks  of base money  and central bank credits  are equal and constant,  and the real net
worth of the central  bank is zero' 5. In this special  case, the seignorage  equals the inflation
tax, and is fully used to extend an interest  rate subsidy  that matches  the government's  real
primary  deficit.  Thus, the government's  real deficit is zero.  The central  bank's real deficit,
the consolidated  public  sector deficit,  the government's  real primary  deficit,  the
seignorage,  the inflation  tax, and the interest  rate subsidy  from the central  bank to the
government  are all equal' 6.
Th'is  steady state is consistent  with a zero output  growth rate.
1 6Notice  that this is a case in which  counting  the inflation  tax as a revenue of the central
bank would  yield zero deficits  (both for the central  bank and for the consolidated  public
sector).  As noted above, this would be awkward,  given that the inflation  rate is positive
and constant.
26nw=cp SO
c5 h m constant
d = d =  dCb  = -r8c  = Pc8 =--=-p=Ph.
P  P
This example may  give the impression  that the methodology  is  just a convoluted
way to arrive at obvious conclusions.  Ultimately,  the government's  real primary  deficit
was financed  by seignorage  revenues,  as it should  be in a model  where  neither the
government  nor the central  bank borrow  from or lend to the foreign  or domestic  private
sectors.  However,  the methodology  does introduce  a discipline  in the assessment  of
central  bank's  accounts  that proves  very fruitful  when th  central  bank operates
extensively  with the private  and foreign  sectors.
Case  2. Private  Sector  Activities  Financed  by Interest Rate Subsidies
Suppose  that the government's  real deficit  is zero, and the only activity of the
central bank is the provision  of zero interest rate  credits to favored  private sector
activities.  Assuming  a steady state with constant  real stocks  for simplicity,  the situation
would be essentially  as follows:
c,  fnWcb  So
cp  a h = constant
=dCb =-~rpcp  = Ph=-  .
27In this case, the real quasi-fiscal  deficit is again equal to the consolidated  public
sector deficit.  But now the central  bank is transferring  resources  from the holders of base
money  to the private  sector (to the recipients  of credits at zero  nominal  interest rates).
T  his situation  is similar to the one where the government's  deficit is due to the provision
of ordinary subsidies  and transfers  to segments  of the private sector (e.g., food subsidies
and payments  to the elderly),  and the deficit is financed  from central  bank credits.  In
both cases  there is a deficit in the public  sector, which originates  from redistributional
objectives,  and which may result in excessive  monetary  creation and inflation.
In this example  the rate of inflation  is constant  and positive,  and the government
does not borrow  from the central  bank or even from the private  sector. Although  this may
appear  as a puzzle, the solution  consists  in accounting  for the real quasi-fiscal  deficit,
-rpcp  = Ph . Indeed,  the transfer  of real resources  associated  to a credit subsidy  is
entirely  equivalent  to that produced  by any other type  of subsidy, ordinarily  included in
fiscal budgets.
Now consider  a steady state where  the nominal  interest rate charged by the central
bank on its loans to the private sector  is positive,  but still below the rate of inflation.  In
this case, the central  bank has a positive  nominal  surplus  equal to ipCp,  but a real deficit
equal to -rpCp . Note also that in this case the real net worth of the central  bank is
positive" 7:
cp  a constant  h  constant  nw = c  - h - constant
'7It is easy to show that
nw =  Pp-'>  0.
28a =  d=  t = -rpcp = Ph = 
This example shows  clearly that nominal  surpluses  are no guarantee  of real
surpluses,  and that real, and not nominal  deficits  provide the correct measure  of the
pressures  towards  monetization.  In this example  the real deficit is associated  with a credit
subsidy.  This type  of subsidy  is common  in developing  countries  and difficult  to
eliminate  in many  cases.
Credit subsidies  may  be the instrument  utilized  by policy-makers  to keep afloat
loss-making  enterprises  and banks.  Large enterprise  losses can arise as a result of the
removal  of protection,  large exchange  rate devaluations,  price controls,  excessive
personnel,  or sheer  inefficiency.  Fear of the social costs of adjustment  may induce
policy-makers  to delay adjustment,  and keep afloat  a large number  of enterprises  through
credit subsidies  from the central  bank. In many cases  enterprise  losses spill  over into
commercial  banks,  through  massive  defaults  on bank loans.  In these cases,  central  bank
credits may be directed  towards  the commercial  banks.
When the central bank's  deficit is directly  or indirectly  associated  to the
subsidization  of loss-making  enterprises,  the ultimate  source of inflation  does  not lie
within the bounds  of the public  sector. In these cases  it is unlikely  that iiiflation  will be
stopped  by measures  that, dealing  exclusively  with the financial  system,  aim at
eliminating  the central bank's  deficit. An increase  in central  bank real interest  rates to
positive  levels does not necessarily  correct  the fundamental  problems  that require
subsidization' 8. If the enterprises  fail to adjust by cutting wages  or investment,  or by
increasing  efficiency,  they will have to continue  receiving  resource  flows. These  flows
181f  these  higher rates  are reflected  in higher  commercial  bank lending  rates the financial
problems  faced by enterprises  may  actually be aggravated.
29usually  take the form of distress  borrowing,  such as massive  defaults  on bank loans or
greater recourse  to inter-enterprise  credits. Of course, in the medium  or long run a wave
of bankruptcies  or subsidization  through  widespread  debt forgiveness  are the only
possible  outcomes.
Under  these circumstances,  a successful  stabilization  may require  closing  down
some  inefficient  enterprises.  Measures  such as corrections  of enterprise  prices and the
financial  restructuring  of potentially  viable  enterprises  and banks may also be needed.
Financial  restructuring  invariably  requires  some fiscal support.  Therefore,  the
stabilization  of inflation  and the elimination  of credit subsidies  may ultimately  require  a
fiscal adjustment,  even when the need for such fiscal adjustment  is not obvious.
Case 3: Foreign  Exchange  Losses  at the Central  Bank
Suppose  now that the central  bank borrows  abroad  and provides  credits in
domestic  currency.  Suppose  further  that the foreign  exchange  losses  incurred by the
central  bank are not properly  taken into account.  Instead,  the central bank's  cash profits
are integrally  distributed  to the government.  To focus on the consequences  of excessive
dividend  payments,  it is assumed  that the domestic  and foreign  real interest  rates are
zero, the nominal  interest rate on reserves  is zero,  and the real exchange  rate remains
constant:
i  =P  i  P  =0  E=P-P  e=O  .
Note that in this case i. = i  + E , that is, there is no subsidy implicit  in central
bank credits.  Thus, if the central  bank interest revenues  were internalized  and reinvested,
there would be no problem,  since the foreign  exchange  losses would  tend to be offset by
the cash profits, resulting  in a constant  net worth. However,  if the cash profits are
30transferred  to the government  a serious situation  may develop  over time. To see this
point, note that the changes  in the central bank's  net worth and in the base money  are
equal to:
N W,. = i,c, +  (i  +  E) NFA  -A
H =Ct +ENFA' -(ic,  +CMNFA)+A
Here credits to the private sector are assumed  to be zero for simplicity,  and
A =  max(a(i,c, +  iNFA),O)  ( a > O),  where a indicates  the proportion  of cash profits
that is distributed  as dividends  to the government.  Notice  the asymmetry  in the
determination  of A: if cash profits  are negative  there are no payments  from the
government  to the central  bank; instead, the central  bank dividend  is set at zero. Thus,
there are two possible  cases. First, if cash profits are nonnegative (i,C.  + iNFA >  0), the
changes  in base money  are given by:
H = (a - l)(i,C  + iNFAE)  + C, + ENFA.
On the other hand, if there are cash losses (i,C.  +i'NFA <0) , the expression
giving changes  in base money  is:
N =  C, -i,,C, +  E NFA -i*NFAKE.
Suppose  that i) cash profits are initially  positive (i.C.  (0)  + i'NFA(O)>  0) , ii)
they are fully distributed  (a  = 1) , and iii) the country is unable  to obtain further  real
foreign finance  (NFA  = 0). Under these  conditions,
N=C,
and
31h+Ph=cg  +APc .
If also h is assumed  constant,
e8 = P(h  - c8 )  c
and hence
c, (t) =  h +  [c,  (O)  - hJe-h  .
So c, converges  asymptotically  to h, and nw - nfa converges  asymptotically  to
zero. Assuming  that initially nw >  0 >  nfa,  c 8 exceeds  h at time zero. This means  nw
and c8 are decreasing  in time, and nw may become  negative.  In the long-run  cash profits
i,C, + iNFA  E  will be positive,  since  nfa converges  to zero. However,  they  can become
temporarily  negative' 9. As long as foreign  liabilities  are large, so that
IhAE=L-E
,nfa  I  P  is
cash profits  will be decreasing 20.
1 9Notice  that when this happens  the regime  of the system of differential  equations
changes.  This is because  the government  does not compensate  the central bank for
negative  cash profits.  Assuming  that the domestic  inflation rate exceeds  the foreign
inflation rate, a necessary  condition for the negativity  of cash profits  is that the assets
c, +  nfa  of the central bank become  negative.  Indeed, it is easy to show that
i,c, +i nfa = -Enfa + P(c,, + nfa) .
If  Po <P  P,then  E> 0, and the negativity  of cash profits requires  cg + nfa < 0 .
2 0To see this, notice that
i,C8 +i'NFA = P[i8  (c, +  cg)+iEnfa] =  [i8h+iE  nfal  .
32Of course, it is doubtful  that such developments  could take place.  The
simultaneous  decrease  of the government  dividend  revenues  and of the real value of the
government's  liabilities  towards  the central bank can only be accomplished  either in the
presence  of a primary  surplus, or through  increasing  borrowing  from the private  sector 21.
Thus the failure to take into account  the valuation  losses  leads to a situation  that is
unsustainable,  and creates a need for larger fiscal  adjustments  in the future.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate  the problems  that may result from the failure  to cover
foreign  exchange  losses.  Figure 2 illustrates  the case A where the interest rate charged  on
domestic  credits  covers the depreciation-adjusted  cost of foreign  liabilities,  but the
central bank distributes  all its cash profits to the government.  Figure 3 shows  the case B
where  no profits are transferred  to the government,  but the interest  rate is significantly
below  the cost of foreign  liabilities.  In both cases the exchange  rate is assumed  to follow
PPP. The initial conditions  and all other parameters  are assumed  to be the same  in the
two cases, as shown in Table 1. The exercise  also assumes  that base money  is constant  in
real terms, and that the nominal  stock  of foreign  liabilities  is constant  in dollars.  It
foliows that the real stock  declines  at the rate of foreign  inflation.
In both cases there is a strong  initial decline  in the real stocks  of domestic  credits
and net worth.  The decline  in domestic  credits relative  to the stock of foreign  liabilities
leads  to a rapid  decline in the real cash profits of the central  bank (the nominal  cash
Also,  when  the domestic  inflation  rate  is very  high, (P'/P)E m P .
21 Assuming  that the government  does not borrow  abroad  or lend to the private  sector,
Ce =  d, +b and d, =  d -J  . Since e'. < O, either  there is a fiscal surplus  (dg  < 0), or  the
government  is increasing  its debt towards  the private  sector (b > O).  As the dividends
paid by the central  bank to the government  dwindle, a fiscal surplus  requires  a primary
surplus (d > 0).
33profits  divided  by the price  level)  , which  become  negative.  Note  that  in both  cases  the
stock  of credits  also  becomes  negative  during  several  periods.  These  trends  are
eventually  reversed  due  to the  continuous  decline  in the real  stock  of foreign  liabilities.
Note  also  that  the parameters  values  imply  that  real  stocks  ultimately  converge.
Table 1
Simulation Parameters
______  C(mO)  H(O)  FL(O)  NW(O)  P'  E  jA  D
Case  A  100  10  90  0  30%  3%  26%  35%  7%  100%
Case  B  100  10  90  0  30%  3%  26%  20%  7%  0%
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Simulation: Case A
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35Figure  3
Simulation:  Case B
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36The exercise  is admitedly  mechanistic,  and generates  some  implausible  results,
such as a decline  of real credits to negative  levels.  However,  it does illustrate  the
continuous  realization  of foreign  exchange  losses through  interest flows, and the
resulting  decline  in central  bank profits.  The problems  that may arise by overlooking  the
dynamic  implications  of foreign  exchange  losses  are made evident.  The decline  in the
stock of credits  and cash profits usually  leads the central  bank to adopt expansionary
monetary  policies.  This is inevitable  if cash profits become  negative  and the central  bank
does not receive  a fiscal support from the government.  The monetary  expansion  may lead
to an endogenous  increase  in inflation  and domestic  nominal  interest rates,  and a
resulting  increase  in nominal  interest revenues,  masking  a deteriorating  financial
situation  within the central  bank.
The situation  of the central  bank of Yugoslavia  during the 1980s  illustrates  very
well  this point. As shown in Figure 4 and Table 2, the policy  of negative  real interest
rates on credits  and the distribution  of a share of the revenues  to the republican
governments  led to a sharp and continuous  decline  in the real stocks  of credits  and net
worth. During  the 1980s,  the ratio of credits to net foreign  liabilities  declined  from 174  to
only 12 percent.  During  the same period inflation  increased  continuously,  leading to an
increase  in nominal  interest  rates and the central  bank's  nominal  interest  revenues.  Since
the nominal  income statements  did not show deficits,  various  governments  were misled
into overlooking  the quasi-fiscal  problem  in sucessive  attempts  to stabilize  the economy
during the 1980s.  As mentioned  before,  the quasi-fiscal  problem was only tackled  in the
stabilization  program  of 1990,  when the stock  of foreign  exchange  losses  was replaced
by a stock of interest-yielding  bonds serviced by the government.
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Central Bank of Yugoslavia
Real Dafatce  Sheet  (Base  = 1980)
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Table 2
Central Bank of Yugoslavia
Rato of Domestic  Assets  to Foreign  Liabilities
and Selected  Interest Rates, 1980.1989
1966  1961  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
Net Dom  1.74  1.67  1.31  0.76  0.63  0.55  0.50  0.29  0.17  0.12
Asset/Net  For.
Limb.
Average Interest  3.5  3.5  3.5  6.5  20  38  48  61  100  1000
Rate on DomesUc
Assets
Interest  on  8.1  8.9  10.3  6  6.4  5.6  4.8  4.8  3.8  7
Forign
Liabilltes  (DM)
Domesllc  37.5  35.7  32.7  60.0  53.0  75.0  92.0  169.0  240.0  2685.0
Inflation  (Dec.)
Domestic  30.9  40.0  31.5  40.2  54.7  72.3  89.8  120.8  194.0  1240.0
Idflatdon  (Avg.)
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39The real balance  sheet of the central  bank of Hungary  shows  a similar pattern.  As
indicated  in Figure 5, there was also a decline  in the real stocks  of credits  and net worth
during  the second  half of the 1980s,  leading to a decline  in central  bank profits. The
situation  is less dramatic  than in Yugoslavia,  as indicated  by a less pronounced  decline  in
the stock  of credits and net worth,  and the fact that the stock  of credits remained  above
the stock  of foreign  liabilities.  Howe 'er, the trends  indicate  a deteriorating  situation  due
to the same causes,  namely,  underpriced  credits and an unwarranted  distribution  of cash
profits.
V. Conclusions and Further Thoughts.
In this paper we review  and discuss  a number  of issues  related  to the relevant
definitions  of fiscal and quasi-fiscal  deficits,  as well as the consolidation  of the two. The
major issues  discussed  are the distinction  between  nominal  and real deficits,  the
treatment  of foreign  exchange  losses, and the treatment  of public  sector loans to the
private sector.
Despite  their limitations,  real measures  of the deficit provide  a less distorted
indication  of the actual fiscal policy  stance than  nominal  measures.  The distinction
between  nominal  and real definitons is even more relevant  in the case of the central
bank's  quasi-fiscal  deficit,  given the financial  nature of the central bank's  operations.
Central  banks rarely recognize  explicitly  their losses in their income  statements.  Moie
often, these  income statements  show sizable  nominal  surpluses,  even in the cases where
there is actually  a real deficit in the operations  with the private domestic  and foreign
sectors.
Real quasi-fiscal  deficits  usually  reflect losses in other sectors of the economy
and the need for a resource  transfer.  Therefore,  a correction  of these deficits may require
more than  a simple  elimination  of credit subsidies  through  an increase  in real interest
40rates to positive levels.  In fact, the elimination  cdf  losses at their source  requires  in many
cases a fiscal adjustment,  even when the need  for such adjustment  is not obvious.
The accumulation  of foreign  exchange  losses  imposes  a burden on the
consolidated  public  sector's  finances.  The fact that this burden  is partly transferred  to
future periods  frequently  leads policy-makers  to overlook  its consequences.  This is
particularly  true in the case  of the central  bank's  own foreign  exchange  losses.  Scenarios
where these  losses are allowed  to accumulate  to very large amounts,  while interest  rates
on domestic  credits  are kept low and the central bank keeps  transferring  its declining
cash profits to the non-financial  public  sector, are not uncommon.  The mounting  burden
of net interest  expenditures  may then constitute  a significant  source of monetary
expansion.  This situation  worsens  considerably  when the central  bank is faced with a net
repayment  of its foreign  liabilities.
We argue that proper  consideration  of foreign  exchange  losses provides  very
important  information  for the  evaluation  of the  fiscal  policy  stance,  even  in situations
where these  losses seem to be largely unrealized.  The distinction  between  realized  and
unrealized  losses  becomes  meaningless  over time, as losses  are continuously  realized
through  interest  flows. A systematic  accumulation  of foreign  exchange  losses  indicates
the need  to adjust the interest  rates on domestic  credits and/or to stop transferring  central
bank cash profits to the government.  Failure  to implement  these measures  in time can
lead to inflationary  episodes  like the one observed  in Yugoslavia  during  the 1980s,  where
a large real quasi-fiscal  deficit was the main factor leading to monetary  expansion  and
accelerating  inflation.
There are conceptual  problems  related  to the treatment  of central  bank lending  to
the private  sector that are similar  to those  related  to government  lending to the private
sector. The existence  of an element of subsidy  in public  sector credits  does imply a
41transfer  of resources  to the recipients  of those  credits.  This subsidy  component  should be
included  in the deficit definition.  Uncollected  or uncollectable  credits  should also be
included,  since they also imply a transfer  of real resources  to segments  of the private
sector. However,  if the extension  of loans by the central bank or the government  to the
private  sector does not imply a negative  variation  in the public  sector's  net worth,  the
justification  for the inclusion  of these  loans  in the deficit is less  clear.
42APPENDIX
A.1. Above  and below  the line deficit  estimates
The consolidated  public  sector comprises  non-financial  and financial  entities.  The
non-financial  public sector includes  the central  and local governments,  extra-budgetary
entities (EBEs)  and state enterprises  (SEs). The financial  public  sector includes  the
central  bank and other public  sector banks and financial  entities.  Although  it is obviously
of interest  to obtain  measures  of the deficit of the consolidated  public  sector, these
measures  are rarely computed.  The deficit figures which  are most commonly  available
and publicized  are the deficits  of central  and local governments.  In some  cases,  the
figures include the deficits of EBEs and SEs. The operations  of the financial  public
sector are rarely properly  accounted  for.
This lack of comprehensiveness  of deficit figures  is not surprising.  The usual
motivation  to transfer  fiscal or quasi-fiscal  operations  outside  ordinary  budgets  is
precisely  to avoid the close monitoring  of these operations  by legislative  bodies,
domestic  groups  of interests,  foreign  creditors,  and international  organizations.  In this
way policy-makers  hope to be less constrained  in the implementation  of fiscal policy.
Therefore,  in many  cases the publicized  figures turn out to be very poor indicators  of the
actual fiscal policy  stance.
In principle,  measures  of the consolidated  public sector  deficit can be obtained  by
properly  consolidating  above the line calculations  of the deficit  of each segment  of the
public sector.  That would  amount to adding  up the budgetary  revenues  and expenditures
of central  and local governments  and the revenues  and expenditures  of other segments  of
43the public sector, as recorded  in their respective  income  statements.  Of course, in
following  this procedure  all transfers  between  segments  of the public  sector are
automatically  netted  out, hence there is no double  counting.
Simple  as it may seem, the attempt  to obtain an accurate  measure  of the
consolidated  deficit through  this procedure  may face  serious statistical  and
methodological  barriers.  Sometimes  the individual  pieces  of information  are not
available.  The statements  of specific  segments  of the public sector may  be aggregated  in
such a way as to make very difficult  the task of consolidation.  Finally, the accounting
methodologies  followed  by different  segments  of the public  sector may differ
significantly,  rendering  the above the line calculations  of the consolidated  deficit
meaningless.  Frequently,  some  segments  of the public  sector construct  their  accounts  on
a cash basis, while  others mix accrued  and cash revenues  and payments,  as well  as capital
gains  and losses with ordinary  payments.
Although  EBE and SE accounts  are known  to constitute  a problem in attempts  to
calculate  the consolidated  deficit,  the most severe problems  are usually  encountered
when the financial  public  sector is brought  into the picture.  This is particularly  true in the
case of central  banks.  As mentioned  above, central  banks around the world display  a
great imagination  in the construction  of their income statements.  For example, interests
on credits  to the government  may be accounted  as a revenue,  even though  those interests
are neither effectively  paid  nor included  as expenditures  in the budget.  A similarly
asymmetric  procedure  may be applied  to credits  to SEs.  The flows do not cancel out, and
above the line estimates  of the consolidated  deficit underestimate  the true deficit.
Another  example  of creative  accounting  is the inclusion  of capital gains  on foreign  assets
in interest revenues,  while capital  losses  on the foreign  liabilities  are altogether  excluded.
The capital  losses may be disguised  in the balance  sheet under one of the several "other
accounts"  created  for this purpose,  or recorded  as special  credits to the government.
44When these  accounting  procedures  are utilized, a simple  consolidation  would also
underestimate  the true deficit.
The computation  of consolidated  deficits  based  on above  the line figures  could
still be attempted  on an ad hoc basis, by including  some  items in income  statements
while  excluding  others. However,  this procedure  would involve  a number  of arbitrary
decisions,  and might result in large measurement  errors. One alternative  route is the
estimation  of consolidated  deficits from below  the line, that is, from the computation  of
the changes  in the assets and liabilities  of the public  sector.
Below the line estimates  of the deficit are not free of problems  either. Accurate
estimates  require a detailed  compilation  of the assets and liabilities  of the various
segments  of the public  sector. For instance,  the computation  of the stock of net domestic
debt requires  not only data on the stock  of government  securities  held by the private
sector, but also data on the stocks  of credits  to and deposits  of the public sector in private
domestic  banks and other financial  institutions.  Credit and deposit  figures may  be
agregated  in such a way as to make impossible  a fine separation  of the public  and private
sectors.  Another  typical  difficulty  is related  to the impact  of cross-currency  fluctuations
on the stocks  of foreign  assets and liabilities.  Absence  of detailed  information  on the
currency  composition  of foreign  assets and liabilities  may render a straightforward
computation  of net changes  meaningless.  Still another  difficulty  is presented  by the
accumulation  and decumulation  of public  sector arrears.  Failure  to include  arrears  in the
stock of liabilities  may also result in large measurement  errors.
The comparative  advantages  and disadvantages  of the above the line and below
the line methods  vary from country  to country.  However,  even in those  cases  where the
computation  of the consolidated  deficit from above the line is feasible  and  judged as
reliable, below  the line estimates  may also prove useful for at least two reasons.  First,
45these  figures may  be used for comparison  and for checking  the above the line figures.
Second,  below  the line calculations  provide  useful  detailed  information  on the sources of
deficit finance.
In this Appendix  we discuss  some measurement  problems  that are typically
encountered  in below the line computations  of public  sector deficits.  These problems
arise because  below  the line estimates  involve  the calculation  of changes  in stocks
relative  to the flow of output.  If the numerator  and the denominator  are measured  at
different  prices  or affected  by exchange  rate movements,  the calculated  ratios will be
distorted.  The foliowing  sections  analyze  and compare  alternative  methods  to measure
the size of money  finance,  domestic  debt finance  and external debt finance  relative to
GNP.
A.2.  Money  finance
Gross seignorage  revenues  are identically  equal to the sum of inflation  tax
revenues  and the real variations  in base money,  as stated in equation  (A.1). To obtain a
measure  of seignorage  revenues  as a share of GNP, equation (A.  1) has to be divided  by
(instantaneous)  real GNP, y = Y/P, where  y = real GNP, Y = nominal  GNP and P = price
level.  That yields equations  (A.2) or (A.3), depending  on whether  the components  of
seignorage  are defined  as shares of real or nominal  GNP.
(A.1)  H =  +
(A2)  H  PH  + Ph  PH  H - PH
(A.3)  H  /  P
Y  y  y  Y 
46This section will explore  alternative  methods  to compute  the integrals  of the
instantaneous  seignorage,  as given by (A.2) or (A.3), from discrete  data on monetary
stocks,  prices and output.  The analysis  will be illustrated  with actual data from Turkey
and Yugoslavia.
Method  1:  Nominal  Discrete  Data
The most straightforward  method of computing  the ratio between  seignorage
revenues  and GNP is to use the available  data on end-of-year  nominal  money  stocks,  a
price index and nominal  GNP. Thus, equation  (A.2) can be computed  as (Method  Ia):
(A.4)  S  =  = w,H, X  + H, - (l + x,)H,,
Here  H is the stock  of base money  at the end of t,  x, = [P(t)/ P(t - 1)]- 1 is the
inflation  rate between t-l  and t, and 34  = J  Y(t -1 + r)dr  is nominal  GNP at t. There is
no obvious  problem in computing  seignorage  revenues  as a share of GNP through
equation (A.4), although  the breakdown  between  the inflation  tax and the real variations
in base money  is likely to be distorted.  This is because  the flows in the numerator  and the
denominator  are measured  at different prices. For instance,  the real variations  component
is measured  at end-of-period  prices, whereas  the price  level implicit  in nominal  GNP is
an average  price. That will tend to overestimate  the gains and losses from this
component.  The reverse  will happen  with the inflation tax component
Alternatively,  the ratio between  seignorage  revenues  and GNP can be computed
as (Method  Ib)
47(A.5)S  H, - H,  l  ~r,  H,  H,/(1 +;r,) - H,,
This method  has a bias that is opposite  to that of Method  la: the gains  and losses
of the real variations  component  are underestimated.  Of course, the figures  obtained  from
the two methods  could be averaged  to produce  better  estimates,  since they  have opposite
biases.
Method  II:  Integral  of the Numerator
The calculation  of seignorage  revenues  from discrete  statistical  data can be
refined  through  the computation  of the integral  of the numerators  and denominators  of
(A.2)  or (A.3). Thus, in the case of equation  (A.2), total monetary  revenues  would  be
computed  by:
(A.6)  ,0  sJH(t  - )  +  Jr)d'r  oP(t -1 + r)H(t - 1 +  rt)dr
f P(t - 1  + r)h(t - I  + r)dr
+  -
Equation (A.6)  can be computed  with discrete  data, assuming  a certain  growth
path for prices and the nominal  and real stocks  of base money  within the year. For
instance,  if these variables  are assumed  to grow exponentially  during the year, the values
of H, P and h at any point in time will be defined by:
H(t - 1  + r) = H(t - I)e  'r
P(t - I  +  T)  P(t - I)e  ~4T
48h(t -1 + r) =h(t  - l)e4r
Here H,, P,, and  h, = H, - P, are the instantaneous growth rates of H, P and h.
H, can be computed  for any year as  H, = ln(H,/H,,)  . P and h are obtained  through  the
same procedure.  The time derivatives  of H, P, and h can then  be easily found.  Under
these assumptions,  (A.6) becomes:
(A.7)  S  -Ha  + h  ,  H  H
Method  II yields the same  result for total seignorage  revenues  as Method  1.
However,  note that the breakdown  between  inflation  tax and real variations  is different.
Note also that the breakdown  provided  by equation  (A.7) is quite intuitive.  It amounts  to
splitting  total seignorage  revenues  according  to the shares  of the growth  rates of prices
and real base money  in the growth rate of nominal  base money.  Of course, the
breakdowd  will depend  on the specific  assumptions  about the intra-year  growth  path of H
and P. Although  the exponential  rule is a good approximation  in most practical  cases,
other growth  rules might prove  more appropriate  under special  conditions.
A similar  method consists  in calculating  the integrals  of the numerator  and
denominator  of (A.3):
fI[H~(t -1I+ r)IP(t  - I+ v)]d T
Using again the assumption  of exponential  growth rates  for H and P yields:
(A.8)  Slb  h  -h,  h,
h,  F  ,
49Here  = J y(t -1 + r)dr  is real GNP during year t. In order to avoid serious
biases in the calculation  of (A.8) the various  variables  have to be deflated  by the same
price index.
Method III: Integral of the Ratio
Another  alternative  is to compute  the integral  of the ratio of seignorage  to GNP
directly, assuming  a certain  growth path for GNP. Again, that  can be done by integrating
either equation  (A.2) or (A.3). For instance,  the integral  of (A.2), on the assumption  of
exponential  growth  rates for all variables  is:
P,  IH,HI  hI  ,H,H 1 I,
(A.9)  Siiia  =  - + IC  H
Ht - Y  Y,  Yt_1  H,-lY,  Y,  Yt-l 
This measurement  technique  is appealing,  since it calculates  the average  of
seignorage  revenues  as a share  of GNP at every point in time within  a year. However,
care must be exercised  in calculating  the beginning-  and end-of-period  ratios  of base
money  to GNP. For example,  in (A.9) H(t)/Y(t) is the ratio of the end-of-period  stock  of
base money  to instantaneous  GNP at time t. In order to calculate  the latter, one can
assume that the intra-year  real output growth rate is constant,  and therefore  equal to
y, = ln(y, /y,,  and solve  the equation
f=  Jy(t  - 1+r)dr  = y(t)- I)f'ejtdf  = y(t -)[e  -1
for y(t - 1).  Thus,
(A.1O)  y(t  -)=4Y]._
50Similarly,  it is easy to check that
(A. I11)  y(t)=  'e'  -l
One can then  follow two alternative  paths. First, for small y,, the terms inside
brackets  in (A.10) and (A.l 1) can both be approximated  by one, so y'(t-  I)  Y  (t) - y(t),
and y, can be approximated  by zero. (A.9) then reduces  to (A.8):
(A.12)  Slllb =SIb22.
Alternatively,  when y, is large, it can be estimated  as the geometric  average  of the
adjacent  real GDP growth rates:
yt~
This estimate can be plugged  in formulas  (A.  10) and (A.  I 1) to obtain  estimates  y,
and y,,,  for y, and Y,-l , respectively 23.
Substituting  these  estimates  in the "real"  version of (A.9), one finally  obtains:
(A. 1 )  S  =  g  [ h,  h,-  4  t  [h,  h,- ]
h-y,Y  Y.lh,  - y  Y  Y,  -
221n this case real  GDP, which appears  as a denominator  in (A.3) is constant.  It follows
that, for that equation,  the ratio of the integrals  equals the integral  of the ratio.
23Notice  that two (slightly)  different  estimates  of y will be generated.  One will be used
in the estimation  of the ratio seignorage  revenues/GNP  in year t (between  times t- 1
and t), and will be obtained  by application  of (A.  11).  The other will be used in the
estimation  of the same  ratio in year t +1  (between  times  t and t + 1), and will be
obtained  by the application  of (A.  10).
51Table 3 provides  a comparison  of these different  methods  with actual data for
Turkey  and Yugoslavia.  Note that Turkey  experienced  moderate  to high inflation  rates -
ranging  from 15 to 90 percent  per annum,  while inflation  rates in Yugoslavia  were much
higher during the same period,  ranging from 30 to 2700 percent per annum.
As shown in Table 3, the differences  among  different  measures  of total
seignorage  revenues  as a share of GNP are minor in both countries.  As discussed  above,
Methods  la and lb do not provide  a satisfactory  breakdown  of total seignorage  revenues
between  inflation  tax and real variations,  compared  with Methods  Ila, lIb and III. As can
be seen from Table 3, the differences  between  the results  yielded by these  three last
methods  are small in both countries.  Moreover,  Methods  Ilb and III yield the same
results  except in those years with large variations  in real output.  It is also interesting  to




Seignorage Revenues as a Share of GNP: 1980-89  (in %)
TURKEY:  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
La. Discrete  (Start-Period  Prces)
1.TOTAL  3.220  4.163  3.369  3.208  3.593  2.918  1.970  2.501  3.964  4.251
2. Inflation Tax  5.946  1.888  2.133  3.221  3.717  3.236  2.220  3.414  3.806  3.471
3. Real Variations  -2.726  2.275  1.235  -0.014  -0.124  -0.318  -0.250  -0.913  0.158  0.780
I.b. Discrete (End-Period  Prices)
1. TOTAL  3.220  4.163  3.369  3.208  3.593  2.918  1.970  2.501  3.964  4.251
2. Inflation Tax  4.658  2.390  2.390  3.218  3.676  3.139  2.162  3.089  3.874  3.777
3. Real Variations  -1.438  1.773  0.979  -0.010  -0.083  -0.220  -0.191  -0.589  0.090  0.475
Ila.  lntegral  of Numerator  (Nominal)
1. TOTAL  3.220  4.163  3.369  3.208  3.593  2.918  1.970  2.501  3.964  4.251
2.  Inflation Tax  5.208  2.140  2.264  3.219  3.695  3.184  2.190  3.237  3.843  3.634
3.  Real Variations  -1.988  2.024  1.104  -0.012  -0.102  -0.266  -0.219  -0.736  0.121  0.617
Ilb.  Integral  of Numerator  (Real)
1. TOTAL  3.776  4.267  3.349  3.186  3.688  2.961  1.965  2.427  4.057  4.350
2.  Inflation Tax  6.107  2.193  2.251  3.198  3.793  3.231  2.184  3.142  3.933  3.719
3.  Real Variations  -2.331  2.074  1.098  -0.012  -0.105  -0.270  -0.219  -0.715  0.124  0.631
Ill.  Integral  of Rato
1.  TOTAL  3.778  4 263  3.349  3.186  3.689  2.962  1.966  2.428  4.057  4.350
2.  Inflation Tax  6.110  2.191  2.251  3.198  3.794  3.232  2.185  3.143  3.933  3.719
3.  Real Variations  -2.332  2.072  1.098  -0.012  -0.105  -0.270  -0.219  -0.715  0.124  0.631
YUGOSLAVIA:  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987  1988  1989
I.a. Discrete (Start-Period  Prees)
I--TOTAL  1.809  2.676  2.701  1.636  3.865  3.600  4.156  4.872  5.526  12.123
2- Inflation Tax  4.274  3.322  2.953  5.073  3.442  4.372  4.407  6.769  7.087  17.034
3- Real Variations  -2.464  -0.645  -0.252  -3.437  0.423  -0.773  -0.251  -1.897  -1.561  -4.912
I.b. Discrete (End-Perod  Prices)
I-TOTAL  1.809  2.676  2.701  1.636  3.865  3.600  4.156  4.872  5.526  12.123
2- Inflation Tax  3.602  3.152  2.891  3.784  3.589  4.040  4.287  5.578  5.984  12.299
3- Real Variations  -1.793  -0.475  -0.190  -2.147  0.277  -0.441  -0.131  -0.706  -0.458  -0.176
lIl.a. bntegal  of Numerator  (NamLnal)
1- TOTAL  1.809  2.676  2.701  1.636  3.865  3.600  4.156  4.872  5.526  12.123
2-  Inflation Tax  3.910  3.232  2.920  4.347  3.520  4.189  4.340  6.058  6.411  13.438
3-  Real Variations  -2.101  -0.555  -0.219  -2.711  0.345  -0.589  -0.184  -1.186  -0.885  -1.316
Il.b. Integral  of Nmnerator  (Real)
1-  TOTAL  1.842  2.781  2.750  1.611  3.719  3.639  4.320  4.886  5.280  11.791
3-  Real Variations  3.982  3.358  2.973  4.281  3.387  4.235  4.511  6.075  6.126  13.070
2-  inflation Tax  -2.139  -0.577  -0.223  -2.669  0.332  -0.596  -0.192  -1.190  -0.845  -1.280
111.  Integral  of Ratio
1- TOTAL  1.843  2.782  2.750  1.611  3.719  3.640  4.320  4.887  5.281  11.777
2-  Inflation Tax  3.983  3.359  2.973  4.280  3.387  4.236  4.512  6.077  6.127  13.055
3-  Real Variations  -2.140  -0.577  -0.223  -2.669  0.332  -0.596  -0.192  -1.190  -0.846  -1.278
Sources:  Quarterly Bulletins of the Central Banks of Turkey and Yugoslavia.
53A.3.  Domestic  Debt  Finance
In the case of domestic  debt finance,  the problem is how to measure the value of
changes  in the stock  of the public  sector's  net domestic  debt relative  to the flow of output.
Again, the nominal  changes  in the stock of net domestic  debt may be broken  down
between  an inflation  component  and real variations  of the stock,  as in equation (A.  13),
which  is formally  identical  to (A.  1):
(A.13)  - =  Pb+b .
The measurement  issues that arise in the calculation  of domestic  debt finance are
thus broadly  the same as those discussed  in the case of money  finance.  The calculation  of
the nominal  deficit from below the line involves  the computation  of the nominal  changes
in the stock  of government  debt relative  to nominal  GNP. In the case of the real deficit
only the real variations  of the stock  will be computed,  since the real deficit definition
excludes  the inflation  component  of interest payments  on the stock.  However,  accuracy
in measurement  is more important  in the calculation  of debt finance,  since only the real
component  is included  in the computation  of the real deficit.  In the case of money
finance,  an accurate  breakdown  is desirable  for informational  purposes,  but does not
affect  the total deficit  calculation.  This is because  it is total seignorage  revenues  that
matter in the calculation,  regardless  of whether  the deficit is defined  in nominal  or real
terms.
A.4.  External  Debt  Finance
In the calculation  of public sector deficits  from below the line, the most severe
measurement  problems  arise in the computation  of the external  finance  component.  The
problem is how to separate  actual financing  flows from abroad  from capital  gains and
54losses resulting  from movements  in exchange  rates.  This problem is aggravated  by the
fact that the stock of net external  debt is quoted  in dollars, which  subjects  it to be
aifluenced  by the variations  in the value of the dollar vis-a-vis other currencies.
Consider  first the simple  case where  the foreign assets and liabilities  of the public
sector are exclusively  denominated  in US dollars.  The problem of cross-currency
fluctuations  will be addressed  further  below.  In this case, the external  finance  component
is defined  by:
(A.14)  Z=E(B  -NFA*)+E(B  -NFAA)
Here, by assumption,  B*  and NFA*  are exclusively  denominated  in US dollars,
and  Z = EZ' = E(B  - NFA*) . Equation (A. 14) breaks down the changes in the stock of
the public  sector's  net external  debt into financing  flows and capital losses  due to
exchange  rate depreciations 24.
24In  the case of external finance,  a straightforward  aplication  of discrete  end-of-period
data will never allow for a fine separation  of the two terms on the right hand side of
(A.13).  The problem lies in the division  of a cross product  between  capital  losses  and
actual financing  flows:
Z, - Z,,I =  E,,1  (Z;*  - Z;,  -) +  (E, - E,-,)Zt-  I + (E,  - E,-,)(Z;*  - Z;,)
The first term on the right hand side of the equation  captures  actual financing
flows, the second term captures the capital losses,  and the third term is a cross product
that captures both. One method  frequently  employed  to obtain a division  of the cross-
product  relies on the arithmetic  averages.  Indeed,  the variations  in the domestic  currency
value of the net external debt may  be written  as:
Z,-  Z,,  =Et,(Z,*  - Z;,)_+(E, -E,_ ,)Z;,'*
Here E, and Z,  are the average  exchange  rate and the US dollar value of the
net external  debt stock, respectively.  However,  it can be easily shown that this simple
55In theory,  discrete  devaluations  are the easiest  to deal with, since the stocks
involved  are constant  when measured  in foreign  currency.  That is, there are no "cross"
terms to be dealt with 25. Therefore,  situations  where  there was a small number  of
devaluations  during a given year  can be easily dealt with. In years  where  devaluations
were frequent one should  still tackle  any large devaluations  individually.  The year  is then
divided  into subperiods  comprised  between  two large devaluations.  In each of these
subperiods  there may have been  a large number  of small devaluations,  and either it is
impractical  to deal with them individually,  or detailed  data is not available.  One can ther
approximate  the growth paths  of the variables  involved  by assuming  specific  functional
forms. In those ca qs where only the end points are known  exponential  growth  is the
most sensible  assumption,  as it corresponds  to a constant  growth  rate.
For instance,  computation  of the integrals  of all terms in equation  (A.  15),
assuming  exponential  growth rules for E and Z* , yields:
(A.15)  Z -Z-I  =Z  - (Z  ,.-  Z.-.  )  +  (.tJz  )  - Z,-)
Here  E, = ln(E,/E,  l,  =  ln(Z,*/ Z 1 -),  and  Z, = E, + Z,  are the exponential
growth  rates of E, Z  and Z within the year. In order to obtain  a measure  of the
magnitude  of the external  finance  component  relative  to GNP, it would suffice  to divide
procedure  will be optimal  only in the unlikely  case that the stock variables  grow linearly
(E(t)=E(O)+at  and  Z*(t)=Z*(O)+bt).
251f  X=EEX  andEchangesto  E+AE,then  X+AX=(E+AE)X*,or  AX=AEJX
if the devaluation  was instantaneous,  so that X  could be considered  as constant.
Otherwise,  AX = AE X* + E AX  + AE  AX  . The "cross" term  AE AX  frequently
complicates  matters in undesirable  ways.
56equation  (A.  15) by nominal  GNP in period t. This procedure  is similar to the one of
Method  II above. Of course, any one of the three methods  proposed  for the calculation  of
the ratio seignorage/GNP  can be adapted  for the calculation  of the external  finance
component.
The calculation  of the foreign  finance component  in real terms does not present
any serious difficulty.  Of course,  in this case, all the variables  in equation  (A.  14) would
have to be defined  in real terms:
(A.16)  z = e (b  - nfa  +  nid)-
In  actual calculations  the nominal  variables  have to be deflated  by the price
indices  judged as most appropriate.  The use of domestic  and foreign  CPIs is one possible
alternative.  That permits  the calculation  of an expression  exactly  equivalent  to (A.  15).
Finally, the existence  of assets and liabilities  in several  currencies  may present  a
problem,  due to fluctuations  of the dollar vis a vis other foreign  currencies.  However,
these  cross-currency  effects  may be taken into account  in two ways.  First, the above
calculations  may be performed  for each individual  foreign  currency.  Alternatively,  the
total dollar value of foreign  liabilities  may be adjusted  for cross-currency  fluctuations 26.
26See  World Bank  (1988) and Van Wijnbergen,  Anand,  Chibber, and Rocha (1992)  for
an illustration  of this second method  for the case of Turkey.
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